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Abstract
This paper reports experimental evidence on a stylized labor market. The experiment
is designed as a sequence of three phases. In the rst two phases, P1 and P2; agents face
simple games, which we use to estimate subjectssocial and reciprocity concerns, together
with their beliefs. In the last phase, P3; four principals, who face four teams of two agents,
compete by o¤ering agents a contract from a xed menu. Then, each agent selects one of
the available contracts (i.e. he chooses to workfor a principal). Production is determined
by the outcome of a simple e¤ort game induced by the chosen contract. We nd that
(heterogeneous) social preferences are signicant determinants of choices in all phases of the
experiment. Since the available contracts display a trade-o¤ between fairness and strategic
uncertainty, we observe that the latter is a much stronger determinant of choices, for both
principals and agents. Finally, we also see that social preferences explain, to a large extent,
matching between principals and agents, since agents display a marked propensity to work
for principals with similar social preferences.
KEYWORDS: Social Preferences, Team Incentives, Mechanism Design, Experimental
Economics
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C90, D86
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I. Preliminaries
Social scientists from various disciplines have been interested for a long time in under-
standing the distribution of rewards -monetary, or otherwise- within and among rms and
organizations. This interest is far from being purely academic. As Blau and Kahn (1996)
argue: Labor earnings are by far the most important component of income for individuals
who are employed; hence, in the absence of any compensatory government policies, low living
standards in market economies will be associated with low labor incomes. More generally,
labor market inequality is a major determinant of disparities in living standards.Decision
makers at organizations choose who is going to receive how much, as well as when and why
this should be so. Consequently, organizations a¤ect inequality by inuencing how jobs are
dened, how rewards are attached to positions, how people are matched to these jobs, and
how workers determine whether they have been treated fairly(Baron and Pfe¤er, 1994).
Economists have, by and large, taken the view that inequality is a natural consequence
of disparities in ability, or simply of asymmetric information. A simple model with hidden
actions would predict that agents with the same level of ability receive unequal pay even
if they make, in equilibrium, the same amount of e¤ort, due to purely random variations
in output.1 Even more extremely, Lazear (1995, p.26) claims that many, including myself,
believe that most motivation is produced not by an absolute reward but by compensation
that is based on relative comparison.He refers to tournament theory, which asserts that
rms motivate workers to exert e¤ort by o¤ering a xed (and sizable) di¤erential in wages,
for even minimally di¤erent nal performance.
In marked contrast, social psychologists emphasize the deleterious e¤ects of inequality
on workersmotivations and social relations within the organization, claiming that decision
makers are likely to use the equity principle in employment contexts and to use the equality
principle to allocate resources in social contexts in which maintaining harmony and positive
relationships are the primary goals.(Jawahar, 2005).
More recently, these two stylized positions have become more nuanced, and the perspec-
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tives have moved towards less extreme, and more complementary, viewpoints. For example,
there has been a surge of survey and experimental evidence in economics showing that
workers have social (i.e. interdependent) and/or reciprocal preferences, with a strong taste
against inequality.2 Thus, even a self-interested manager should take this into account when
constructing her pay packages and may moderate the use of incentive pay and other forms
of unequal payo¤s. On the other hand, researchers in social psychology and organizational
behavior recognize that there are situations in which inequality may be benecial for an
organization. For example Bloom (1999) claims that, since greater dispersion is negatively
related to the performance of those lower in the dispersion [...] and positively related of
those higher in the dispersion, [...] it may be benecial for a law rm to pay a relatively high
salary to attract a top attorney or for a university to o¤er an endowed chair to a particularly
productive scholar. In other types of organizations-re ghting and rescue squads, theatrical
casts, manufacturing teams, and hotel customer service sta¤s, for example- the situation is
quite di¤erent because the poor performance of a particular worker cannot be compensated
for by the better performance of the other workers, and the outstanding performance of one
person is unlikely to inuence organizational outcomes over the long term if the performance
of others is lacking. The interesting part of this observation, from the point of view of an
economist, is that the benets of inequality seem to be directly linked to the intrinsic charac-
teristics of the production technology. More precisely, the conditions under which inequality
is likely to be benecialstrongly depend on the existence of activities which display strate-
gic complementarities. These activities are such that the protability of an action increases
when others are also taking it. This situation normally leads to multiple equilibria. Thus,
any institutional device to align agentsexpectations about others-call it, along with Kreps
(1990), corporate culture- can be thought as a key to the success of organizations.3
As it turns out, strategic complementarities are the key ingredient with which Winter
(2004) justies the existence of inequity within an organization. In his model, a principal
has to design the optimal contract for a team of ex-ante identical agents. A contract species
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a prole of monetary rewards, one for each agent, if the team is successful in the assigned
project. Technology is such that agents can increase the probability of success of the
project by performing -independently and simultaneously- a costly action. This probability
only depends on the number of agents who put e¤ort, and not on their identity.4 Under these
conditions, he is able to show that complementarities are not only su¢ cient, but also neces-
sary for the optimal solution (that is, the contract which implements the high-e¤ort e¢ cient
equilibrium as a unique equilibrium of the game) to yield inequality in rewards. This is be-
cause, if agentsexertion of e¤ort induces a positive externality on the e¤ectiveness of other
agentse¤ort, it is optimal to promise high rewards to some agents so as to make the others
condently believe that these highly paid agents will contribute, hence allowing the planner
to save resources by o¤ering other agents substantially less.5 Even though Winters (2004)
result abstracts from the existence of social preferences, it adds an additional ingredient to
the debate on inequality by showing that the principal faces a trade-o¤ between robustness
and fairness considerations: fairness can be obtained only at the expense of robustness to
strategic uncertainty. In this respect, one can only expect this trade-o¤ to be exacerbated
by the presence of (inequality-averse) distributional preferences.
The aim of this paper is precisely to test experimentally the idea that workers(heteroge-
neous) social preferences are crucial in determining the contracts they are o¤ered and choose.
We are also interested in the way our experimental subjects resolve the trade-o¤ between
robustness and inequality: they can choose either contracts in which the all-e¤ort prole is
the unique equilibrium, but inequality is enhanced, or contracts in which the all-e¤ort prole
is not the unique equilibrium, but inequality is mitigated. In this respect, individuals more
concerned with equity (and less worried about coordination failure) may nd convenient
to opt for the latter alternative. Finally, since another solution to the trade-o¤ is sorting
(agents with similar distributional concerns work for the same rms), this will also be an
important element of our experimental design.
With these goals in mind, we design and perform an experiment with three phases.
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1. In the rst phase (P1), subjects are randomly matched in pairs and play a sequence
of Dictator Games in which they have to choose among four options, each of which
corresponds to a monetary payo¤ pair (one for them, one for their teammate). The
choice set, which changes at every round, corresponds to the (all-e¤ort) equilibrium
payo¤s of the games they will face later in the following two phases. We use P1 to
estimate the subjectspurely distributional preference parameters within the realm of
Charness and Rabins (2002, C&R hereafter) model.6
2. In the second phase (P2), subjects are, once again, randomly matched in pairs and are
rst asked to choose among four options (within the same choice set and sequencing
as in P1). This choice induces a simple 2x2 game which subjects have to play at a
subsequent stage. This second stage corresponds to the e¤ort game induced byWinters
(2004) technology, given the option (i.e. the contract) chosen at the rst stage. Since
in P2 reciprocity may play a role -as agents could condition their e¤ort decision to
their teammates (publicly observed) contract choice- we use the second stage of P2 to
estimate subjectsC&R reciprocity parameters, together with their beliefs in the e¤ort
game.
3. In the third phase (P3); there are 4 principals and 4 pairs (teams) of agents. Prin-
cipals o¤er a contract (a 22 game, such as those played in P2) selected from a given
set. We expect, and then corroborate in the data, that the presence of several com-
peting principals acts as a kind of menu of contracts among which agents may sort
themselves.
This three-stage experimental design (and the associated estimation strategy) is novel,
and it is especially designed to solve the identication problem discussed by Manski (2002),
which is related to the di¢ culty to disentangle preference and beliefs parameters when the
experiment produces only observations on game outcomes which result from the interaction
between subjectspreferences and beliefs. As in P1 (our Dictator Game) beliefs do not play
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any role, we use data from P1 to estimate subjectsdistributional preference parameters,
which we assume determine, together with reciprocity concerns and beliefs, subjectschoices
in P2. Under the assumption that distributional preference parameters are constant across
phases, data from P2 convey useful information to estimate subjectsreciprocity and beliefs.7
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper in which the estimation of
distributional parameters is carried out at the level of each individual subject participating
in the experiment.8
Let us summarize the main observations of our study.
1. Subjects display a signicant degree of heterogeneity in their decisions, and thus, in
estimated preferences and beliefs.
2. This heterogeneity explains, to a large extent, agentsbehavior. That is, preferences
and beliefs which best explain agentsbehavior in P1 and P2; typically also explain the
contracts they choose among those o¤ered by the di¤erent principals in P3; together
with their subsequent e¤ort decision. Around 80% of total observations in P3 are
consistent with the estimated preferences and beliefs of the concerned agents.
3. We also observe that equality is a less important consideration than robustness. The
egalitarian (but not robust) contract is rarely selected, by both principals and agents
and, when it is selected, it very often yields the low e¤ort outcome. This, in turn,
implies lower prots, for both principals and agents.
4. Finally, we nd that principals and agents sort themselves according with their social
preferences. An agents probability of selecting a given contract in P3 decreases with
the distance (in the parameter space) between her estimated preferences and those of
the principal for whom she ends up working. Moreover, we also see that, not only the
agents, but also principals end up o¤ering contracts (which we like to view as stylized
corporate cultures) more in tune with their own estimated distributional preferences.
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The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we briey review the
emerging literature which deals with strategic uncertainty, contracting and market competi-
tion in the presence of social preferences. Section 3 describes the game-form (or mechanism)
that subjects play in the lab and the mechanism design problem facing the principal. In
Section 4 we describe the experimental design and procedures. In Section 5 we develop an
econometric model in which principals and agentsdistributional preferences and beliefs are
estimated in phases P1 and P2 respectively. Section 6 discusses the testable questions arising
from the theory. Final remarks and guidelines for future research are placed in Section 7,
followed by an appendix containing proofs and the experimental instructions.
II. Related literature
Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990, 1991) are probably the best known experimental
works on the e¤ects of strategic uncertainty in coordination games. Crawford (1995) and
Crawford and Haller (1990) are theoretical papers partly inspired by these experimental
results. Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2006) is a more recent experimental work designed
to measure the extent and importance of strategic uncertainty in coordination games. The
only other experimental work dealing directly with the e¤ect of strategic uncertainty on
contract choices that we know of is that of López-Pintado, Ponti and Winter (2008), who
test directly Winters (2004) model in the lab.
The economic literature on social preferences in economics is, to a large extent, a re-
sponse to the vast experimental evidence challenging the standard hypothesis of selsh-
ness.9 A variety of models were devised to explain these observations.10 It would be too
di¢ cult to discuss all the models, so we refer to the excellent surveys of Fehr and Schmidt
(2000) and Sobel (2005).
There has been some theoretical work on the consequences of social preferences for labor
markets. Franks (1984) seminal contribution shows that wages may depart from the value of
marginal productivity if workers care high enough about relative payo¤s. Fershtman, Hvide
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and Weiss (2005) explore the e¤ects of status on e¤ort. They show that rms hire groups
of workers of heterogeneous productivities. They also show that wages may di¤er across the
economy for equally productive workers, and that the quest for status may increase total
output. Cabrales, Calvó-Armengol and Pavoni (2008) and Cabrales and Calvó-Armengol
(2008) study (respectively) long-term and static contracts in the presence of social preferences
and competition. One of the main implications of both studies is that workers will sort
themselves into di¤erent rms according to their levels of ability. In this respect, their results
are consistent with the eld evidence, as well as with the experimental results reported in
this paper. Rey-Biel (2005) shows that the threat of inequity in pay after bad performance
can actually induce e¤ort at a lower cost to the principal than without social preferences.
Kosfeld and von Siemens (2006) show that di¤erent levels of worker cooperation can be the
result of competition in the labor market if workers have heterogeneous social preferences
and these preferences are private information. Teyssier (2007) proves the existence of a
separating equilibrium that explains the coexistence of multiple payment schemes in rms.
In her model, inequity averse agents are attracted by a revenue-sharing scheme in which joint
production is equally distributed, whereas selsh agents prefers tournaments. If the market
is perfectly exible, this separating equilibrium induces a high e¤ort level for both types of
agents.
On the experimental side, one of the rst applications of social preferences in the lab is
Charness (2004), who shows that volition in choosing a wage has a signicant e¤ect on sub-
sequent costly e¤ort provision, implying that reciprocity is important in experimental labor
markets. Erikson and Villeval (2004) nd that other-regarding preferences a¤ect contrac-
tual choices and the sorting e¤ect of performance pay schemes. This suggests that e¢ ciency
wages may be an explanation for the scarcity of variable pay schemes. Their data also exhibit
more sorting in terms of employeesdegree of reciprocity than in terms of skill level. Fehr,
Klein and Schmidt (2007) show (both theoretically and experimentally) that the presence of
even a minority of people with concerns for fairness can alter in an important way the kind
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of contracts that are e¢ cient.
Finally, let us briey review some empirical evidence on sorting in labor markets.
Dohmen and Falk (2006) study the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a con-
trolled laboratory experiment. They nd that output is much higher in variable (as opposed
to xed) pay schemes, such as piece rate, tournament, or revenue sharing. Moreover this
di¤erence is largely driven by productivity sorting: on average, the more productive a worker
is, the more likely she self-selects into the variable pay scheme. Krueger and Schkade (2007)
report a positive and statistically signicant relationship between a workers tendency to in-
teract with others while not working and the relative frequency of work-related interactions
on the workers job. They interpret this pattern as an evidence of sorting: more extroverted
workers tend to accepts jobs that require greater social interaction. Bellemare and Shearer
(2006) run a eld experiment to measure the risk preferences of a sample of workers (within
a real rm) who are paid incentive contracts and face substantial daily income risk. They
nd that workers are risk tolerant, and the high level of risk tolerance suggests that both
sorting and transaction costs are important determinants of contract choices when workers
have heterogeneous preferences.
III. The game
The economic environment we reproduce in the most complicated part of the experiment
(phase 3, P3) has the following features. Within each round t;
1. At Stage 0, Nature moves rst, xing the choice set Ct =

bk
	
; k = 1; :::; 4;, where
bk = (bk1; b
k
2) denes a contract. By construction, b
k
1  bk2; 8k (i.e. 1 denotes the identity
of the best paid agent, constant across all contracts in Ct): Then, 4 principals (indexed
as Player 0) choose, simultaneously and independently, which contract they want to
o¤er for that round;
2. At Stage 1, 8 agents are randomly paired in 4 teams, with player position (either agent
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1, or agent 2) determined randomly. Each agent has to choose her favorite contract
within the set C0t  Ct of contracts o¤ered by (at least one of the) principals. Once
contracts have been chosen by agents, another random draw selects which agent is the
Dictator in the choice of the contract, that is, the agent whose choice determines the
ruling contract b 2 C0t for the pair.
3. At Stage 2 production takes place and payo¤s are distributed, according to a simple
e¤ort game-form G(b) induced by the contract b selected by the Dictator in Stage 1.
The rules of G(b) are as follows. Each agent i = 1; 2; has to decide, simultaneously
and independently, whether to make a costly e¤ort. We denote by i 2 f0; 1g agent
i s e¤ort decision, where i = 1(0) if agent i does (does not) make e¤ort. Let also
 = (1; 2) 2 f0; 1g2 denote the agentsaction prole. The cost of e¤ort c is assumed
to be constant across agents. Team activity results in either success or failure. Let
P () dene production as the probability of success as a function of the number of
agents in the team who have put e¤ort:
(1) P () =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if 1 + 2 = 0;
 if 1 + 2 = 1;
1 if 1 + 2 = 2;
with  2 (0; 1
2
):11
If the project fails, then all (principal and agents) receive a payo¤ of zero. If the
project succeeds, then agent i receives a benet, bki > 0: Agent i
0s expected monetary prot
associated to contract k is given by
(2) ki () = P ()b
k
i   ic:
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The expected monetary payo¤ for the principal is determined by the di¤erence between
expected revenues, for a given (randomly generated) value for the project V  U [A;B]; and
expected costs:
k0() = P ()(V   bk1   bk2):
A. The mechanism design problem
We are now in the position to characterize the mechanism design problem upon which
we constructed the (optimal) contracts which are available -to the principals and agents- in
the experiment.
Assume a principal who wishes to design a mechanism that induces all agents to exert
e¤ort in (some) equilibrium of the game induced by G(b); which we denote by  (b). A
mechanism is an allocation of benets in case of success, i.e., a vector b that satises this
property at the minimal cost for the principal.
In this respect, two alternatives routes are possible. Following Winter (2004), the prin-
cipal may consider only mechanisms that strongly implement the desired solution, in the
sense of the following
Denition 1 (Strong INI mechanisms). We say that the mechanism b is strongly investment-
inducing (sting) if all Nash Equilibria (NE) of  (b) entail e¤ort by all agents with minimal
benet distribution.
If the principal is not particularly worried about the strategic uncertainty induced by
the presence of multiple equilibria (precisely, by the existence on an equilibrium in which
both agents do not make e¤ort), he may opt for the following (cheaper) alternative, satisfying
the following
Denition 2 (Weak INI mechanisms). We say that the mechanism b is weakly investment-
inducing (wing) if there exists at least a NE of  (b) such that  = (1; 1), with minimal benet
distribution.
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In Appendix A we solve the mechanism design problems associated with both Denitions
1 and 2, under a wide range of alternative agentsdistributional preferences (see Section V.
for details).
IV. Experimental design
In what follows, we describe the features of our experimental environment.
A. Sessions
Three experimental sessions were conducted at the Laboratory of Theoretical and Ex-
perimental Economics (LaTEx), of the Universidad de Alicante. A total of 72 students
(24 per session) were recruited among the undergraduate population of the Universidad de
Alicante -mainly, students from the Economics Department with no (or very little) prior
exposure to game theory.
The experimental sessions were computerized. Instructions were read aloud and we let
subjects ask about any doubt they may have had.12 In all sessions, subjects were divided
into two matching groups of 12. Subjects from di¤erent matching groups never interact with
each other throughout the session.13
B. Treatment
In all sessions, subjects played three phases, P1 to P3; of increasing complexity, for a
total of 72 rounds (24 rounds per phase). This was done to gradually introduce subjects to
the strategic complexity of the market environment and to estimate, in P1 and P2; subjects
preferences and beliefs.
In any given phase, matching group and round; team composition was randomly deter-
mined. Within each phase and for each round t, the choice set Ct =

bk
	
; k = 1; :::4; where
bk  (bk1; bk2); was drawn at random, but not uniformly.
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 Each contract bk in the set Ct is the optimal solution of one mechanism design prob-
lem, either wing or sting, for some given and commonly known randomly generated
preference prole.14
 Depending on the round t, the choice set Ct could be composed of
1. 4 wing contracts generated from 4 di¤erent preference proles;
2. 4 sting contracts generated from 4 di¤erent preference proles;
3. 2 wing and 2 sting generated by two di¤erent preference proles.
 We grouped rounds into time intervals. A time interval is dened as a group of three
consecutive rounds (starting at 1), and indexed by p so that round  p = f3(p   1) <
t  3pg; is part of time interval p = 1; :::; 8. Within each time interval  p, subjects
experienced each and every possible situation, 1: 2: or 3: The particular sequence of
three situations within each time interval was randomly generated. We did so to
keep under control the time distance between two rounds characterized by the same
situation:
 Player position (either player 1 or player 2) was also chosen randomly, for each team
and round.
We now describe in detail the specic features of each phase, P1; P2 and P3:
P1 : Dictator Game (24 rounds).We use the classic protocol of the Dictator
Game, to collect our subjects distributional preferences without any interference with any
strategic consideration. In P1; the timing for each round and matching group is as follows:
1. At the beginning of the round, six pairs are formed at random. Within each pair,
another (independent and uniformly distributed) random device determines player po-
sition.
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2. Then, each agent, having been informed of her player position in the pair (common to
all contracts), selects her favorite contract within Ct; the pool of 4 options available
for that round.
3. Once choices are made, another independent draw xes the identity of the Dictator
(for that couple and round). Let k^ denote the ruling contract (for that couple and
round) corresponding to the Dictators choice.
4. Monetary consequences are as follows i = bk^i c (i.e. subjects receive the corresponding
equilibrium payo¤s of the induced e¤ort game G(bk^)).
P2 : E¤ort Game (24 rounds). Phases 1 to 3 are identical to those of P1: Instead
of Phase 4, we have
4.1 Subjects play the e¤ort game G(bk^).
4.2 Agentsmonetary payo¤s are distributed according to the payo¤ function (2).
P3 : The Market (24 rounds). This is the phase we described in the introduction,
that is, the full-edged matching market. At the beginning of P3; within each matching
group, 4 subjects are randomly chosen to play as principals throughout the phase. Then,
in each round t; these 4 principals have to select one contract Ct to o¤er to the 4 teams
in their matching group. We denoted by C0t  Ct the set of contracts o¤ered by at least
one principal (this set may be a singleton, since contracts o¤ered by the principals may all
coincide, as it often happened in the experiment). Agents have then to choose within this
subset C0t : Phases 2-4.2 are then identical to P2:
C. Payo¤s
In phase P2 and P3 subjects always received, as monetary reward, their expected payo¤,
given the strategy prole selected in the e¤ort game G(b): This was to make the experimental
environment closer to the models assumption of risk neutrality.
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All monetary payo¤s in the experiment were expressed in Spanish Pesetas (1 euro is
approx. 166 ptas.).15 Subjects received 1:000 ptas. just to show up. Monetary payo¤s in
the experiment (in ptas.) were calculated by xing c = 10;  = 1
4
, A = 100 and B = 125
(i.e. V  U [100; 125]): Average earnings were about 21 euros, for an experimental session
lasting for approximately 90 minutes.
D. Three (testable) questions from the theory
We are now in the position to specify the main objectives of our experiment.
Q1. Is it inequality aversion or strategic uncertainty aversion? Remember that optimal
contracts have been calculated by using two di¤erent mechanism design strategies
(denoted by sting and wing in Denitions 1-2), with rather di¤erent strategic and
distributional characteristics. Two kinds of questions arise here.
Q1.1. Which contract type (sting or wing) is chosen more often by principals and
agents? Evidence for this in Remark 8.
Q1.2. What is the role of strategic uncertainty? That is, to which extent the (non)
existence of multiple equilibria in wing (sting) a¤ects agents behavior in the
e¤ort game. Evidence for this in Remarks 9 and 10.
Q2 Does separation emerge? In other words, is the market able to sort (principals and)
agents according to their distributional and reciprocity preferences? Evidence for this
in Remark 12.
Q3. Do models of social preferences work? That is, does a model with distributional and
reciprocity preferences provide a reliable framework to predict principals and agents
behavior? Evidence for this in Remarks 11 and 13.
V. Estimating social preferences
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In this Section, we shall rst set up an econometric model by which we directly estimate
subjectspreferences. In what follows, i and j identify our subjects matched in pairs ac-
cording to the experimental protocol described in Section IV.. We assume that our subjects
preferences are dened by a slight modication of the one proposed by C&R, as follows.
Denition 3 (C&R Preferences)).
ui() = i()(3)
 (i   ij)max fj()  i(); 0g   (i + ij)max fi()  j(); 0g ;
where j =  1 if j has misbehaved, and j = 0 otherwise. In words, if player j has
misbehaved, player i increases her envyparameter i (or lowers her guiltparameter
i) by an amount equal to i. Thus, i can be interpreted as player is sensitivity to negative
reciprocity. Model (3) has the useful feature that it subsumes parameters which account for
subjectsdistributional tastes ala F&S (i and i) as well as for their tastes for reciprocity,
i.
As we shall explain later, our experimental setup is particularly well suited to estimate
both distributional and reciprocity concerns. With respect to the former, there are four
particularly important subsets of parameters, which we now describe.
Denition 4 (Egoistic Preferences (EP)).
(4) i = i = 0:
Denition 5 (Inequality Aversion Preferences (IAP)).
(5) 0  i < 1; i  i:
Distributional preferences with constraints as in equation (5) were rst proposed by F&S.
F&S do not consider reciprocal motives (that is, it is assumed i = 0; and, in this sense,
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preferences are purely distributional). In addition, following Loewenstein et al. (1989), F&S
also impose to the model conditions (5), by which guilt (i) is bounded above by 1 and envy
(i) cannot be lower than guilt.
The literature has also focused upon two alternative subsets of parameters for (3), which
also neglect reciprocal motives by xing i = 0; namely status seeking (SSP, see Frank,
1984) and e¢ ciency-seeking (ESP, see Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) preferences. The
former assumes that an increase in the other players monetary payo¤ is always disliked,
independently of relative positions. The latter, that a reduction in her own payo¤ is accept-
able only if it accompanied by an increase (at least of the same amount) in the other players
payo¤.
Denition 6 (Status-Seeking Preferences (SSP)).
(6) i 2 [0; 1); i 2 ( 1; 0]; jij  jij
Denition 7 (E¢ ciency-Seeking Preferences (ESP)).
(7) i 2 ( 1
2
; 0]; i 2 [0;
1
2
); jij  jij
Even though C&R follow F&S in only considering IAP preferences, we jointly call -with
a slight abuse of notation- C&R distributional preferences the four types of preferences
described above: EP, IAP, SSP and ESP). This four specications are dened as distri-
butional, in that the parameter measuring reciprocity, i; is taken to be zero for all four
types.
A. Estimating distributional preferences using P1.
As we already noticed, in our Dictator Game (P1), agents receive the (all e¤ort) equi-
librium payo¤ (2) corresponding to the option selected by the Dictator. Given that the
identity of the Dictator is randomly determined for each round and pair, this seems the ideal
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situation to estimate pure distributional preferences, since there appears to be no issue of
reciprocity.
In each round t, let Lit be a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if subject i is the lower
paid agent- and zero otherwise. Assuming that each subject i is characterized by her own
parameters i and i, her utility from choosing contract k at round t can be written as
ukit = (1  Lit)

k1t   i
 
k1t   k2t

+ Lit

k2t   i
 
k1t   k2t

+ "kit:
According to this notation, subject i chooses contract k at round t if
ukit = max
 
u1it; : : : ; u
4
it

(remember that 4 contracts are available in each round). Under the assumption that the
stochastic term "kit is iid with an extreme value distribution, the probability that individual
i chooses the contract k at round t is therefore
Pr (yit = kj1(:); 2(:)) =
exp
 
(1  Lit)

k1t   i
 
k1t   k2t

+ Lit

k2t   i
 
k1t   k2t
P4
k=1 exp
 
(1  Lit)

k1t   i
 
k1t   k2t

+ Lit

k2t   i
 
k1t   k2t
 :(8)
Notice that (8) allows for parameter heterogeneity across subjects. Thus, the iid assumption
does not stem from neglected individual unobserved heterogeneity, and it is consistent with
the random order of the four contracts in the choice set Ct. In Figure 1 we plot the estimated
i and i of each member of our subject pool.
Figure 1: Estimating individual social preferences
Figure 1 is composed of two di¤erent graphs:
1. In Figure 1a) each subject corresponds to a point in the (i; i) space, where we high-
18
light the regions corresponding to the taxonomy we proposed in Section V.. As Figure
1a) makes clear, our subjects display signicant heterogeneity in their distributional
preferences. Moreover, in many cases, the constraints on absolute values (in particular,
in the case of IAP) are violated. This is the reason why, in what follows, we shall refer
to the corresponding quadrant in Figure 1a) to identify each distributional preference
type. In this respect, the majority of subjects falls in the rst quadrant (i.e. in the IAP
case), followed by SSP and ESP. Finally, 10% of agents in our subject pool display both
i and i negative (a case not covered by the theoretical literature on these matters).
2. Figure 1b) reports, together with each estimated (i; i) pair (as in Figure 1a), the
corresponding 95% condence intervals associated to each individual estimated para-
meter. As Figure 1b) shows, we have nowmany subjects whose estimated distributional
preferences fall, with nonnegligible probability, in more than one region. Moreover, for
some of them (about 20% of our subject pool), we cannot reject (at the 5% condence
level) the null hypothesis of egoistic preferences.
Table 1 summarizes our results on subjectspreference heterogeneity by partitioning our
subject pool, assigning each subject to the quadrant (Q1 to Q4) of Figure 1 in which their
estimated parameters are most likely to fall. At the same time, we group in an additional
EPcategory those subjects whose estimated i and i are jointly not signicantly di¤erent
from zero (at the 10% condence level). Following this approach, Table 1 assigns each
experimental subject (principals and agents) to the corresponding distributional preference
type.
Table 1: Preference types of agents and principals
As for many subjects falling in quadrant Q1 (i.e. the IAP region) in Figure 1, the
estimated i and i are in fact not signicantly di¤erent than zero, the biggest group in
Table 1 is that of Q4 (i.e. ESP: 29.17% of the total), followed by Q2 (SSP: 22.22%).
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B. Estimating reciprocity and beliefs using P2.
Our P1 is a simple Dictator Game game in which, by choosing a contract, subjects
enforce (provided they are selected as Dictators) a particular benet prole for the team.
By contrast, in P2; after selecting their favorite contract, they are then asked to play the
induced e¤ort game, where they may (if they wish) condition their e¤ort decision upon the
contract choice of they teammate (which is made public before they have to make their e¤ort
decision). For subjects with pure distributional preferences this feature of the experimental
design of P2; is irrelevant. This is because, once the game is set, the identity of the Dictator
and foregone payo¤s associated to contracts which have not been selected do not a¤ect
monetary outcomes in the e¤ort game. This is not true if subjects are also concerned with
reciprocity.
In recent years there has been substantial experimental evidence supporting the claim
that reciprocal motives cannot be fully captured by the reduced formof purely distribu-
tional preferences.16 Paradigmatic is Falk et al.s (2003) experimental evidence where, in a
reduced Ultimatum Game in which the Proposer has only two possible options, the respon-
dersreaction does not only depend on current material payo¤s, but also on the payo¤s that
would have been available if the Proposer would have chosen otherwise.
Prompted by these nding, we now proceed to estimate our subjectsreciprocal concerns
within the realm of C&Rs model (3). To do this, we need rst to operationally identify what
misbehaviormeans in the context of our experimental setup. In this respect, we shall use
contract choice decisions by j and i in Stage 1; denoted as kj and ki; respectively, which
are publicly observed before xing the identity of the Dictator:
(9) j =
8><>:  1 if b
kj
i < b
ki
i ;
0 otherwise.
By (9), j misbehaves by choosing a contract kj which assigns i a strictly lower benet
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than what i would have guaranteed herself with ki:
With this specication for reciprocity in mind, Table 2 reports the relative frequencies
of positive e¤ort decisions in P2, conditional on subjectsbehavior in Stage 1.
Table 2: Relative frequencies of positive e¤ort decisions in P2
Table 2 shows that in about 35% (= (118 + 181)= (339 + 525) ) of the cases the con-
tracts chosen by Player 1 are less favorable to Player 2 than the one actually chosen by
Player 2, that is in 35% of the cases Player 1 misbehaves (i =  1). This percentage is
almost constant across contract types. On the other side, Player 1 observes her teammate to
misbehave (j =  1) in 30% (=193/339) of the cases if the played plan is a wing and in 38%
(=202/525) of the cases if it is a sting: Actions following misbehavior are heterogeneous: in a
wing plan is e¤ort following js misbehavior is typically lower than after correct behavior.17
In a sting contract, however, only the non Dictator Player 2 e¤ort is signicantly lower after
js misbehavior. In Table 2 we also track is willingness to make e¤ort following their own
(mis)behavior; i: Also in this case, misbehavior yields lower e¤ort proles with the wing
plans and - as before - with the sting plans a reaction appears only for Player 2 when she is
not the Dictator.
It would be wrong to draw immediate conclusions from the descriptive statistics in the
previous paragraph. In table 2 di¤erences in e¤ort are only related to misbehavior, but
this does not control for other factors -such as absolute and relative payo¤s of the contract
being played, or the contingent choice set available in the particular round, Ct. A more
comprehensive analysis can only be done by estimating a model in which we can control for
all those factors (and their subtle interplay).
With this purpose in mind, we look at agentse¤ort decisions in P2 as the result of a
process of expected utility maximization. Individual i will choose to make e¤ort in Stage
21
2
 
ki = 1

if
(10) Eki

uki
 
1; kj
  uki  0; kj  > 0;
where Eki [] indicates the expected value taken with respect to the beliefs of player i on js
e¤ort choice under the ruling contract, k. We parametrize ki as a logistic function of the
distributional features of contract k; bkj and
 
bki   bkj

; and on player is own misbehavior in
Stage 1, i:
(11) ki =
exp
 
 1i +  2b
k
j +  3(b
k
i   bkj )

1 + exp
 
 1i +  2b
k
j +  3(b
k
i   bkj )
 :
Consistently with the descriptive evidence of Table 2, our belief specication (11) allows
player i to anticipate that her own behavior in Stage 1 may a¤ect js willingness to put
e¤ort. In addition,  2 and  3 proxy the e¤ect associated with player position and the
type of contract (either wing or sting) being played. Our specication for the reciprocity
parameter i in (3) -again, consistently with Table 2- allows js behavior to a¤ect is e¤ort
decision di¤erently, according to i0s player position (1 vs. 2) and to the Dictator role. Letting
Di = 1 if individual i is the Dictator, and zero otherwise, we have:
(12) i = 1Di (1  Li) + 2 (1 Di) (1  Li) + 3DiLi + 4 (1 Di)Li
Assuming that the latent index on the LHS of (10) has an extreme value distribution, the
probability to observe the individual i making e¤ort given the plan k is given by:
Pr
 
ki = 1j (i; i; i) ; Li; Di;
 
bk1; b
k
2

=
exp

Eki

uki
 
1; kj

exp

Eki

uki
 
1; kj

+ exp

Eki

uki
 
0; kj
 :(13)
Assuming that distributional preferences estimated in P1 are constant across phases (i.e.
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that we can use each subjects (i; i) pair to parameterize her distributional tastes), the
e¤ort decision taken in Stage 2 of P2 reveals individualssubjective belief over their team-
matese¤ort decision (ki ) and their own sensitivity to reciprocity (i). Consistently, our
estimation strategy is a two step procedure: we rst estimate (i; i) from P1 where beliefs
and reciprocity do not play any role, in the second step we estimates - via partial maximum
likelihood- the parameters of ki and i replacing
bi; bi in (13). Given the two-step nature
of the procedure, we use P1 to obtain N = 150 bootstrap estimates of (i; i) for each of the
72 subjects and we use them to obtain a bootstrap distribution of the second step estimates.
The reported estimated standard errors of the parameters of ki and i take also into account
matching group clustering.
Table 3: Estimated parameters of belief function and reciprocity.
Table 3 reports the estimation results. As for our belief specication (11), we see that
both coe¢ cients associated with (relative) payo¤s,  2 and  3, are signicant, indicating
that player i is expecting more e¤ort the higher js payo¤
b 2 > 0 and lower e¤ort if her
teammates is Player 2 (b 3 < 0 and bki   bkj > 0) . As for our account for reciprocity in {s
beliefs,  1; we nd (and expect) a positive coe¢ cient, although not statistically signicant.
Similar considerations hold when we look at the estimates of the four coe¢ cients for i in
(12) conditional on Player and Dictator positions.18 None of them is signicant, and those
associated with Player 2 (1) are positive (negative).
To summarize, our estimations do not yield statistically signicant reciprocity parame-
ters for subjectsbeliefs and behavior, at least conditional on the specic functional forms
(11-13). Conditional on the estimated distributional preferences we carry from P1, only
(absolute and relative) payo¤s seem to have a signicant e¤ect on how subjects form their
beliefs and make their e¤ort decisions.19
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VI. Testable questions
We devote this section to provide answers to our conjectural hypotheses and discuss
several methodological (as well as empirical) issues raised by our novel theoretical and ex-
perimental setting.
A. Q1:Is it inequality aversion or strategic uncertainty aversion?
We rst analyze subjectsrevealed preferences over the type of contract, wing or sting, to
see how subjects resolved the tension between fairness and strategic uncertainty we discussed
in Section 1, and how this depends on their individual social preferences. As explained in
Section IV., in 8 out of 24 rounds of the experiment, agents and principals had to choose
between two optimal wing and two optimal sting contracts. Table 4 reports the relative
frequency of subjectschoices of a sting contract in the 8 rounds in which both types of
contracts were available.
Table 4: Relative frequencies of the sting choice in the mixedrounds.
Remark 8. sting is the most frequent choice for all players and phases.
As Table 4 shows, in all phases, sting is by far the most popular choice, and this is
particularly true for Player 1 (who, in P2; goes for wing only 7 out of 288 times!). Principals
also display a higher preference for sting, even though choice frequencies are much closer
to those of the less advantaged Players 2. In order to assess the extent to which social
preferences a¤ect the probability of choosing a sting (instead of a wing) contract, we need
to control for the inequality in the available contract choice set Ct; which varies substantially
from period to period. To do this, we construct a variable associated to each contract k in
Ct; which measures the relative inequality induced by contract k, in comparison with the
other available options in Ct :
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(14) k =

bk1   bk2

 mink

bk1   bk2

maxk

bk1   bk2
 mink bk1   bk2 ; k = 1; :::; 4:
By (14), k 2 [0; 1]; i.e. we normalize the inequality each contract implies with respect to
the choice set Ct. We thus dene !t =
P
k2wing kP
k2sting k
as a relative inequality indexassociated
with the choice of wing vs. a sting contract in Ct:We are now in the position to estimate
the following logit function:
Pr (kit 2 stingji; i; !t) =
exp ( 0 +  1i +  2i +  3!t)
1 + exp ( 0 +  1i +  2i +  3!t)
;
where kit identies the contract choice of individual i at round t. For Players 2 (Principals),
we use observations from P2 (P3).20 We do so to frame the contract choice problem over the
same choice sets, Ct; since in P3 agentschoice sets are determined by principalsdecisions.
In Table 5 we report the partial maximum likelihood estimates of  1 to  3 with bootstrap
standard errors.
Table 5: Sting vs. wing choice in the mixedrounds, logit regression
Notice that:
1. Estimated  3 are always positive and signicant: the more unequal is the wing choice
the more likely is the choice of a sting contract, whatever the player role: on average,
a 1% increase of the relative inequality index !t induces an increase of the 29% of
the probability of choosing sting for Player 2, and of 14% for the principals in P3.
These results are maintained (both in sign and magnitude) if we use a xed-e¤ects
logit model.
2. For principals, distributional parameters are not signicant to explain the choice of
contract type, while for Players 2 in P2, both  and  are signicant, with opposite
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sign.
Table 6: Relative frequencies of positive e¤ort decisions in P2 and P3
We now discuss agentse¤ort decisions in P2 and P3. Table 6 shows that individual is
willingness to put e¤ort is higher when she faces a sting contract: when we focus on P2 we
see that with a sting contract Player 1 (the better paid) puts e¤ort in 92% of the cases, while
the same statistic drops to 51% in the wing contracts; for the Player 2 the corresponding
gures are much lower (62% and 43%).21 If we compare the e¤ort decisions in P2 and P3 we
observe that only for Player 1 in the wing case there is an overall reduction of the e¤ort in
P3. (51% vs 44%).
Remark 9. E¤ort is much higher in sting that in wing.
We now look at the extent to which contract choices are able to solve the coordination
problems agents face in the e¤ort game. Table 7 shows that the relative frequencies of the
e¢ cient equilibrium (the one in which both players put e¤ort) are about twice larger in sting
than in wing (about 60% vs 30%).
Remark 10. In wing, the ine¢ cient all-no-e¤ort equilibrium pools more than 1/3 of total
observations, and it is played more frequently than the e¢ cient equilibrium.
Also notice that about 30% of total observations correspond to a (non-equilibrium)
strategy prole in which only one agent puts e¤ort. While this frequency stays basically
constant over phases and mechanisms, it is quite remarkable that the identity of the working
agent crucially depends on the mechanism being played (either wing or sting): in sting the
relative frequency of outcomes in which only Player 2 puts e¤ort never exceeds 4% while, in
wing, this frequency is three times bigger. This is probably due to the strategic uncertainty
created by the existence of multiple equilibria in wing (strategic uncertainty which a¤ects
both agents). Finally, if we look at the evolution of outcomes over time, we see that, for
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both wing and sting, the relative frequency of e¢ cient equilibria is falling, although, in wing,
this e¤ect is much stronger. In addition, the frequency of the ine¢ cient no-e¤ort equilibria
almost doubles, when we compare the rst and the last 12 repetitions of each phase.
Table 7: Outcome dynamics in the e¤ort game.
To summarize, if we look at the mechanism design problem from the principals view-
point, our evidence yields a clear preference for the sting program: despite its being more
expensive (since the sum of benets to be distributed is higher), the di¤erence in average
team e¤ort is su¢ cient to compensate the di¤erence in cost. In addition, in the mixed
rounds of P3, principals o¤ering sting contracts were selected by agents with a much higher
frequency. This, in turn, implies that average prots for a principal when o¤ering a sting
contract in the mixedrounds was substantially higher, three times as much as the corre-
sponding prots when o¤ering a wing contract (95.4 ptas. vs. 30.1).
B. Q2: Does separation emerge?
One way to interpret the results of the previous section is that distributional preferences
play a role to resolve the trade-o¤ implicit in the wing-sting choice only for player 2. Matters
change when Ct is composed of the same contract type, either sting or wing, and therefore,
di¤erences across contracts in Ct are less pronounced. We shall refer to periods character-
ized by an homogeneous contract choice set as non-mixed. In this case, the wing-sting
trade-o¤ is not an issue, and principals and agents may ne-tune their contract decisions
to their individual distributional tastes. To test this conjecture, we look at how principals
and agentsestimated preferences explain their contract decision, with respect to the two
dimensions which are more natural for the problem at stake: a) the total cost of the contract
(b1 + b2) and, b) its induced inequality (b1   b2). By analogy with k; we then dene, for
each choice set Ct, the following two variables:
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 k =

bk1 + b
k
2

 mink

bk1 + b
k
2

maxk

bk1 + b
k
2
 mink bk1 + bk2 ; k = 1; :::; 4; and(15)
k =
1 + k
1 +  k
:
We interpret  ; as a measure of relative e¢ ciency (or relative cost, from the principals
viewpoint). Consequently, k proxies the trade-o¤agents (principals) face between inequality
and e¢ ciency (total costs).
We study principalscontract decisions by regressing k and  k in P3; against subjects
distributional parameters, i and i: Given that, in both cases, the dependent variable is
bounded both from above and from below (with upper and lower limits which are period
dependent), we estimate the equations using a double censored tobit model:
(16) yit =  1i +  2i +  3Vit +  
0
4Dt + vit;
where the dependent variable yit refers, alternatively, to the corresponding k and  k induced
by the contract choice k made by individual i at time t; Vit is the randomly generated value
for the principal, and Dt is a full set of period dummy variables. In Table 8 we report the
partial maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters with bootstrap and cluster adjusted
standard errors. We estimate the parameters separating the periods in which the contract
menu includes both sting and wing contracts (mixed periods) from the others (non
mixed).
Table 8: Relative cost choice () and inequality-total costs trade-o¤ ()
for principals in P3
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First notice that Principals opt for the most expensive contract available more than
50% of the cases (the latter corresponds to the right-censored observations), and more that
2=3 of the cases in the non-mixed periods. By contrast, less than 10% go for the cheapest
one. We explain this evidence by the e¤ects of competitions among principals, and the fear
of having their o¤ered contract not chosen by any agent. Consistently with the evidence of
Table 5, also notice that, in the mixed periods, principalsdistributional parameters are only
marginally signicant in explaining the choice of k and  k: this is another indirect evidence
of the predominance of the search for robustness we already observed for the wing=sting
choice. By contrast, in the non-mixed periods, we see that both principalsdistributional
parameters signicantly explain their preferred k: In the natural direction: the highest the
(inequality-averse) distributional concerns, the lowest the relative inequality, and the highest
the relative cost for the principal.
Table 9: Inequality-ine¢ ciency trade o¤ () for players in P2
As for the agents we use an equation similar to (16) - here Vit plays no role - to study their
choice about the inequality - ine¢ ciency trade-o¤ (k) in P2. Estimation results, conditional
on Player positions, are shown in Table 9: we generally nd -as intuition would suggest- a
(negative and signicant) relation between distributional concerns and relative inequality.
These considerations justify the following.
Remark 11. Distributional preferences parameters estimated in P1 account well for agents
(principals) and observed contract choices in P2 (P3):
This last remark could be interpreted as an indirect evidence on sorting: for both prin-
cipals and agents, horizontal distributional concerns matter when they have to decide on the
contracts to o¤er and to choose. In this respect, contract selection is crucial for understand-
ing sorting. More direct evidence on sorting should come from the direct inspection, in P3,
of how distributional parameters explain the matching process. In other words, to properly
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understand sorting we need to look at the extent to which principals and agents of similar
distributional tastes tend to form matches.
To do this, we estimate the probability that a principal is chosenby an agent in each
period as a (logit) function of the (euclidean) distance -in the (i; i) space- between agents
and principals estimated distributional preferences:
Pr
 
agent i chooses principal jj (i; i) ;
 
j; j

;Dc

=
exp ( ij + 
0Dc)
1 + exp ( ij +  0Dc)
;
where ij =
q
(i   j)2 +
 
i   j
2
and Dc is a full set of matching group dummies. We
estimate the model using only those periods in which not all the principals o¤er the same
contract to the pool of agents. The estimated coe¢ cient  is -0.336, (bootstrap and cluster
adjusted std. err. 0.099), for a p value of 0.001. This evidence justies the following
Remark 12. Agents are more likely to choose a contract o¤ered by a principal with more
similar distributional preferences to her own.
C. Q3: Does the social preference model work?
One direct way to answer this question is through the use of data from P3 (our stylized
matching market) to check whether our structural model (and the corresponding estimation
strategy using the evidence from P1 and P2) is able to explain (and predict out-of-sample)
agentse¤ort choices in P3:22 Once we provide agents with parameters on tastes for distrib-
ution (in P1) and reciprocity, and beliefs about their teammates action in the e¤ort game
(in P2), we can fully characterize the agentse¤ort decision at the individual level in P3:
Using the evidence from P3 with the same layout of Table 2, each cell of Table 10
reports a) relative frequencies of actual positive e¤ort decisions, b) relative frequencies of
predicted positive e¤ort decisions and c) relative frequencies of instances in which actual
and predicted behavior coincide. Predicted behavior is identied by subjectse¤ort decision
which maximizes expected utility (3) in the e¤ort game, subject to their estimated preference
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parameters (i; i; i) and their subjective beliefs evaluated by (8).
Table 10: Actual and predicted behavior in Stage 2 of Phase P3
We begin by looking at actual behavior. As Table 10 shows, the overall level of e¤ort
in P3 is similar to the level of e¤ort observed in P2 (see Table 2): Player 1 puts e¤ort in
91% of the cases of sting contracts where this percentage for her teammate drops to 64%;
both player types put e¤ort about 43% of the time when they face a wing contract. The
only di¤erence with respect to P2 can be noticed for Player 1 with wing contracts (51%
of e¤ort decisions in P2 vs 44% in P3). There is instead a noteworthy di¤erence about
misbehavior. In fact, due to the competition among the principals who, in 80 cases out of
144 (6 matching groups 24 rounds) converged to a single contract o¤er, the possibility to
misbehave is severely reduced. The agent i observed agent j misbehaving less than 10% of
the times in wing contracts (it was 30% in P2) and less than 20% in sting contracts (it was
at least 34% in P2). Conditional on misbehavior (either j =  1 or i =  1) there are
some discrepancies between the e¤ort rates in P2 and P3, but these are di¢ cult to interpret
as robust evidence against the hypothesis of consistent behavior between P2 and P3 because
of the small number of observations available.23 As for the comparison between actual and
predicted behavior, our behavioral model correctly anticipates subjectse¤ort decisions in P3
in 894 out of 1152 cases (about 78%), with a slightly better predicted power in sting rather
than wing (80% against 74%, respectively). As for the latter, the most likely forecast mistake
(for both player positions) is to predict no e¤ort when agents decided otherwise. Overall,
the model seems to frame subjectsdecisions accurately, which justies the following
Remark 13. Estimated preferences and beliefs predict about 80% of observed agentse¤ort
decisions.
A more indirect, but still useful, way to check for the ability of the model to account
for the subjectsbehavior is to look at the robustness of estimates across alternative design
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specications.
Two features of our experimental design looked, ex ante, particularly likely to have
a¤ected our inferences from the data.24
1. In our experiment, player position assignment was the outcome of an i.i.d. draw. We
did this to be able to obtain individual estimates of both distributional parameters,
 and . On the other hand, one might argue that, xing player position across
the entire experiment, may yield di¤erent estimates for distributional and reciprocity
parameters. For example, inequality might be perceived as less important for the the
richestPlayer 1, since she never experiences a position at the lower end of the stick
(or, by the same token, inequality may be perceived as more important by the less
favored Player 2).
2. Players were choosing their favorite contract before being acknowledged of the identity
of the Dictator. The reason why we used this procedure (also known as the strategy
method) was to collect observations on contract decisions for all subjects and rounds
(not only in cases where a particular subject turned out to be the Dictator). However,
one might argue that when using this procedure, fairness can be achieved in two ways.
Either by playing the fairequilibrium in each single round or by playing the unfair
equilibrium in each round and let the random Dictator role allocation provide overall
fairness. Thus, the uncertainty of not knowing whether the agent decision was binding
could change agentsbehavior in di¤erent directions. For instance, it is possible that
by xing the role of the Dictator before the choice of the contract we would observe
that agents choose less often faircontracts (or would have a less pronounced concern
for reciprocity).
For these reasons, in May 2007, we run three extra sessions (i.e. 6 additional inde-
pendent observations) to investigate these issues. In these new sessions we made only two
modications of the original design:
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(i) We xed the player position throughout the experience (i.e. across all 72 rounds).
(ii) We made public the identity of the Dictator before the contract choice (i.e. we only have
observations on contract decisions on behalf of Dictators). As in TR1; the Dictator
role was assigned randomly within each pair (i.e. subjects were selected as Dictators
approximately 50% of the times).
In what follows, we shall denote by TR1 (TR2), evidence coming from the original (alter-
native) treatment conditions. Clearly, in P1 of TR2; we can only estimate one distributional
parameter per subject, either  (Player 2) or  (Player 1). Figure 2 shows the distributions
of i and i estimated in P1 of TR1 and TR2.
Figure 2. Comparison of the distribution of i and i in TR1 and TR2
As Figure 2 shows, social preference parameters display very similar distributions across
treatments. For the empirical distributions depicted in Figure 2, the hypothesis of equality
of the means is not rejected (with t-statistics equal to 0.24, and 1.07, respectively), and the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics do not reject the hypotheses of equality of the distributions
(with KS statistics of 0.11 and 0.15, respectively).
Table 11. Relative frequencies of positive e¤ort decisions
in P2 and P3 of TR3
We now compare subjectse¤ort decisions in P2 in the two di¤erent treatments. By
analogy with Table 6, in Table 11 we report relative frequency of e¤ort decisions, disaggre-
gated for contract type (wing or sting), player and dictator position. First notice that, in
TR2, both players, ceteris paribus, work less (on average, almost 25% less). This e¤ect is
stronger for Player 1 in wing and Player 2 in sting. We also see that, for wing, there is a
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decrease in e¤ort frequencies, which about 2=3 of the corresponding levels of TR1, while for
sting the di¤erences in e¤ort levels across treatments are smaller. As for reciprocity, remem-
ber that, in TR2; we cannot measure misbehavior as in (9), since only dictators are asked
to elicit their favorite contracts (and, therefore, relative comparisons cannot be performed).
This implies that we are not in the position to estimate beliefs and reciprocity parameters
as we did for TR1:
To summarize: we were not able to detect signicant di¤erences across treatments at the
level of contract decisions (in P1), but the e¤ort choices in P2 and P3 appear to be sensitive
to treatment conditions. They are higher when subjects interchange player positions across
rounds. This evidence points to a dynamic aspect of social preferences, which our static
model cannot account for.
VII. Conclusion
Our experimental results show that strategic uncertainty should be an important con-
cern for those in charge of designing organizational incentives. In fact, in our context, where
strategic uncertainty conicts with social preferences in terms of their respective recommen-
dations on contract design, the primary consideration appears to be strategic uncertainty.
However, this does not mean that social preferences do not matter for contract design, in
that we also provide evidence showing that distributional preferences are a key determinant
of contracts o¤ered and accepted, on e¤ort levels, as well as on how markets sort di¤erent
attitudes towards distributional issues into organizational cultures.
Our experimental environment is certainly ad-hoc in some respects.25 Nevertheless, our
experimental results are encouraging, because a parsimonious model of individual decision
making is capable of organizing consistently the evidence from a complex experimental en-
vironment. In this respect, the model of social preferences we choose seems to pass our
empirical examination. Given that principals face a more complex strategic environment,
since they compete with other principals to attract agents, the stability of social preferences
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(and beliefs) across quite di¤erent environments is a positive piece of news for the research
program in interdependent preferences. It is true that the literature has already discussed
the ability of di¤erent models to explain quite diverse data sets.26 But, to the best of our
knowledge, this discussion has been done by showing that the same distribution of parame-
ters that explains behavior in experiment A, also explains behavior in experiment B with a
di¤erent subject pool. While this is suggestive, it does not go far enough. Since individuals
in experiments A and B are di¤erent, it is possible that a subject that appeared to be highly
fair-minded in experiment A, would have given the opposite appearance had she participated
in experiment B.27 Our experiments provide a more denitive test, by following subjects
choices (with particular reference to principals decisions), and showing their consistency
with social preferences, across rather di¤erent tasks.
We conclude by discussing three possible avenues for future research.
From a theoretical standpoint, it would be interesting to solve completely the mechanism
design problem under incomplete information about the social preferences of the agent. The
menus of contracts available to agents, possibly through the market via rms with di¤erent
corporate culturesas in our experiment, could have a theoretically interesting structure.
From an empirical point of view, it would be interesting to observe the e¤ect of having
agents of di¤erent productivities, which are also private information. In this way we could
see how nely and in which ways corporate culturepartitions the agents. Also, notice that,
in our setup, the numbers of principals and agents exactly balance one another. Thus, the
e¤ect of more intense competition on the side of either principals or agents is an empirically
interesting extension.
Finally, we also would like to check the extent to which agentsdecisions (and, conse-
quently, the estimated distributional preferences which derive from these decisions) depend
on whether the choice of the optimal contract is made before or after agentsare told about
their player position in the game. If agents choose the contract before knowing their rela-
tive position within the team (i.e. under the veil of ignorance), their decisions may also
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reect individualsattitude to risk, as well as distributional considerations. This exercise
would require to collect additional information about our experimental subjects on these two
complementary dimensions, measuring how these dimensions interact in the solution of the
decision problem facing them in the experiment.
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Appendix A
VIII. Solving Stage 2
By analogy with our experimental conditions (and without loss of generality), we assume
b1  b2: in what follows, we shall solve
A. Solution of the mechanism design problem under the wing program
In the case of wing, the search of the optimal mechanism corresponds to the following
linear program:
b  (b1; b2) 2 arg minfb1;b2g[b1 + b2] sub(17)
u1(1; 1)  u1(0; 1)(18)
u2(1; 1)  u2(1; 0)(19)
b1  b2  0(20)
Assumption (20) is wlog. To solve the problem (17-20 ), we begin by partitioning the
benet space B =

(b1; b2) 2 <2+; b1  b2
	
in two regions, which specify the payo¤ ranking of
each strategy proles in G(b): This partition is relevant for our problem, since it determines
whether in (1,0) - player 1 exerts e¤ort and player 2 does not - whether it is player 1 or 2
the one who experiences envy (guilt):
R1 =

b 2 B : b2  b1   c


;
R2 =

b 2 B : b1   c

 b2  b1

:
Let g1(b1) = b1

g2(b1) = b1   c

dene the two linear constraints upon which our par-
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tition is built. The strategy proof is as follows. We shall solve the linear program (17-20) in
the two regions independently (since, within each region, social utility parameters are con-
stant for each agent and strategy prole), checking which of the two solutions minimizes the
overall benet sum b1 + b2, and determining the constraints on preferences which determine
the identity of the best-paid player 1.
Wing under EPs. As for the solution of wing under EPs (i.e. with 1 = 2 = 1 =
2 = 0), the linear program (17-20) simplies to the following:
min b1 + b2
subject to:
b1   c  b1
b2   c  b2
bi  0; with i = 1; 2
In this case, the solution of the problem is problem is trivial:
b1 = b

2 =
c
1  :
Wing under IAPs. As for the solution of wing under IAPs, we need to add to the
basic linear program (17-20) the IAPs constraint (5).
Proposition 14 (winiIAP). The optimal wing mechanism under IAPs is as follows:
b1 =
0B@ c( 1+2( 1+1)+21+( 1+21)( 1+2) 12( 1+)(1+2 1+( 1+1+2) ;
c( 1+1)( 1+2 2+( 1+22))
( 1+)(1+2 1+( 1+1+2)
1CA if 1 < 12;(21)
b2 =

c(1  1)
1   ;
c(1  1)
1  

if 1 
1
2
;(22)
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with 1  2.
To prove Proposition 14, some preliminary lemmas are required. Let b^k  (b^k1; b^k2) dene
the solution of the linear program (17-20) in Rk:
Lemma 15.
(23) b^1 =

c(1 + 2)
(1  ) ;
c( + 2)
(1  )

:
Proof. In R1; agent 1s monetary payo¤, as determined byG(b); is always higher (i.e. 1() 
2(); 8). This, in turn, implies that constraints (18-19) correspond to
b1  f 11 (b1) 
c(1  1)
(1  )1
  1  1
1
b1;(24)
b2  f 12 (b1) 
c
1   +
2
1 + 2
b1:(25)
Let xki dene the value of b1 such that f
k
i (b1) = 0. By the same token, let y
k
i denote the
intercept of fki (b1); i.e. f
k
i (0): Finally, let 
k
i denote the slope of f
k
i (b1): We then have
x11 =
c
1  and x
1
2 =   c(1+2)(1 )2 : Also notice that 0   12 = 21+2 < 1 and y12 = c1  > 0: This
implies that f 12 (b1) and g
2(b1) intersect in the rst quadrant of the b1  b2 space. On the
other hand, f 11 (b1) is never binding in this case, since 
1
1 =  1 11 < 0 and x
1
1 =
c
1  <
c

since  < 1
2
: This implies that b1 + b2 is minimized where f 12 (b1) and g
2(b1) intersect, i.e.
when b^11 =
c(1+2)
(1 ) and b^
1
2 =
c(+2)
(1 ) .
Lemma 16. In R2; the optimal wing contract under IAPs is (21) when 1 <
1
2
, and (22)
when 1  12 , with 1 < 2:
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Proof. In the case of R2, constraints (18-19) correspond to
b1  f 21 (b1) 
c(1  1)
(1  )1
  1  1
1
b1;(26)
b2  f 22 (b1) 
c(1  2)
1 + 2   (1  2)
+
2 + 2
1 + 2   (1  2)
b1:(27)
This implies that f 11 (b1) = f
2
1 (b1) (i.e. the Nash equilibrium condition for player 1 remains
unchanged in both R1 and R2),  21 =  1 11 < 0 (i.e. j
2
1j > 1 if 1 < 12); and 0   22 =
2+2
1+2 (1 2) < 1:
We rst show that 1  2: Let  = min f1; 2g. If 1 > 2; then the optimal solution
in R2 would be b^1i = b^
2
i =
c(1 )
1  (i.e. b^
1
i + b^
2
i = 2
c(1 )
1  ): On the other hand, if 1  2;
then b^1i + b^
2
i  2 c(1 
)
1  : More precisely, if 1 <
1
2
; the optimal solution is (21), that is, the
intersection between f 21 (b1) and f
2
2 (b1); if 1  12 ; the solution is (22), that is, the intersection
between f 21 (b1) and g
1(b1):
We are in the position to prove Proposition 14.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 1]. To prove the proposition, it is su¢ cient to show that b^1i >
b^2i ; i = 1; 2: To see this, remember that f
1
1 (b1) = f
2
1 (b1). Also remember that f
k
1 (b1) is (not)
binding for both k = 1 and k = 2: If xkli solves f
k
1 (x) = g
l(x); then x122 = x
22
2 =
c(1+2)
(1 ) ;
which, in turn, implies
b^11 =
c(1 + 2)
(1  ) > x
21
1 =
c(1  1)
1    b^
2
1 and
b^12 =
c( + 2)
(1  ) > x
21
1 =
c(1  1)
1    b^
2
2:
Wing with SSPs. As for the solution of wing under SSPs, we need to add to the
basic linear program (17-20) the SSPs constraint (6).
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Proposition 17 (winiSSP). The optimal wing mechanism under SSPs is (21), with 1  2.
Proof. We begin by showing that, as in the case of IAPs, the optimal wing contract in R1
is (23). This is because, also in this case, f 11 (b1) is not binding, since 
1
1 =  1 11 > 1 and
x11 =
c
1  <
c

.
On the other hand, the optimal wing contract in R2 is (21), independently of the value
of 1: This is because, given  1 < i < 0, both  21 and  22 are positive. Since  21 =  1 11 ;
j 21j > 1 (i.e., as before, f 21 (b1) and f 22 (b1) intersect in the rst quadrant. Also notice that,
given i < 0; i = 1; 2; y
2
1 =
c( 1+1)
(1 )1 < 0: Two are the relevant cases:
1. If 1 > 2; then f
2
1 (b1) and f
2
2 (b1) intersect outside R2; and the optimal solution would
be b1 = b2 =
c(1 )
(1 ) :
2. If 1 < 2; then the solution is (21) which overall cost is never greater than
2c1 )
(1 ) :
We complete the proof by noticing, by analogy with the Proof of Proposition 14, that
the optimal solution lies in R2; rather than in R1:
Wing with ESPs. In the case of wing with ESPs, we need to add to the basic linear
program (17-20) the ESPs constraint (7).
Proposition 18 (winiESP). The optimal wingmechanism under ESPs is (21), with 1  2.
Proof. We begin by showing that here the optimal wing contract in R1 is (23) if j2j < 
and b^1 =
n
c

; 0
o
if 2  : This is because, like in the previous cases, f 11 (b1) is never binding,
since x11 =
c
1  <
c

and  11 =  1 11 < 0. On the other hand, given that x
1
2 =   c(1+2)2(1 ) and
0   12  12 ; f 12 (b1) is binding if and only if j2j <  (i.e. if x12 > c ):
As for R2; we begin to notice that  21 =  1 11   1 (since j1j <
1
2
) and that 0
 22 =
2+2
1+2a(1 2) < 1: This implies, like before, that f
2
1 (b1) and f
2
2 (b1) intersect in the rst
quadrant. The rest of the proof is identical of that of Proposition 17.
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B. Solution of the mechanism design problem under the sting program
In the case of sting, the search of the optimal mechanism corresponds to the wing linear
program (17-20) with an additional constraint (implementation with a unique equilibrium):
(28) u1(1; 0)  u1(0; 0):
The constraint (28) makes, on behalf of player 1, the choice of putting e¤ort a weakly
dominant strategy.
Sting under EPs. The solution of sting under EPs is as follows (see Winter 60):
b1 =
c

;
b2 =
c
1  :
Sting under IAPs.
Proposition 19. The optimal sting mechanism under IAPs is
(29)
8><>: b

1 =
c((1+1)(1+2) (1 2))
(1+1+2 (1+1 2)) ;
b2 =
c(1+1)(+2)
(1+1+2 (1+1 2)) :
To prove Proposition 19, we follow the same strategy as before.
Lemma 20. b^1 =

c(1+2)
(1 ) ;
c(+2)
(1 )

:
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Proof. In R1; the constraints for agent 1 and 2 correspond to:
b1  f 11 (b1) 
c(1  1)
(1  )1
  1  1
1
b1;(30)
b1  f 13 (b1) 
c(1  1)
(1  )1
  1  1
1
b1;(31)
b2  f 12 (b1) 
c
1   +
2
1 + 2
b1;(32)
Let xkli solves f
k
1 (x) = g
l(x): We rst notice that (30) is not binding. This is because (30)
denes a constraint which is parallel to (31), but with a smaller intercept (y11 < y
1
3; since
 < 1): Also notice that, in this case, (31) is not binding either. This is because,  13 < 0;
 12 > 0 , and x
12
3 =
c(1 1)
(1 ) < x
12
2 =
c(1+2)
(1 ) :
This implies that, in R1; (b1 + b2) is minimized (like in wing) where f 12 (b1) and g
2(b1)
intersect, i.e. when b^11 =
c(1+2)
(1 ) and b^
1
2 =
c(+2)
(1 ) .
Lemma 21. The optimal sting contract in R2 is (29).
Proof. R2, the relevant constraints are as follows:
b1  f 21 (b1) 
c(1  1)
(1  )1
  1  1
1
b1(33)
b1  f 23 (b1)   
c(1 + 1)
1
+
1 + 1
1
b1(34)
b2  f 22 (b1) 
c(1  2)
1 + 2   (1  2)
  2 + 2
1 + 2   (1  2)
b1:(35)
Notice that, by analogy with R1; condition (33) is not binding since  21 < 0 , 
2
3 > 0 and
x11 =
c
1  < x
3
3 =
c

. Also notice that 0 < x212 =
c(1 2)
1  < x
21
3 =
c(1+1)

and x222 =
c(1+2)
(1 ) >
x223 =
c

: This, in turn, implies that, f 23 (b1) and f
2
2 (b1) always intersect in the interior of R2,
which implies the solution.28
We are in the position to prove Proposition 19.
Proof. To close the proposition, it is su¢ cient to show that b^1i  b^2i ; i = 1; 2: To see this,
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notice that x122 = x
22
2 =
c(1+2)
(1 ) (i.e. f
2
2 (b1) and f
2
2 (b1) cross exactly at the intersection with
g2(b1)): Since  22 =
2+2
1+2 (1 2) > 0 and b^
2 is interior to R2; the result follows.
Sting under SSPs.
Proposition 22. The optimal sting mechanism under SSPs is (29):
Proof. By analogy with the IAP case, in R1; (30) is not binding. Also notice that  13 =
 1 1
1
>  12 =
2
1+a2
> 0: Two are the relevant cases:
1. if 2   1;(i.e. if x123 = c(1 1)(1 )  x122 = c(1+2)(1 ) ); then (34) is not binding,
and the optimal solution is the intersection between f 12 (b1) and g3(b1); that is, b^
1 =
c(1+2)
(1 ) ;
c(+2)
(1 )

;
2. if 2 <  1; then the optimal solution is the intersection between f 12 (b1) and f 13 (b1);
that is, :
b^1 =

c(1 + 2)(1  1(1 + ))
(1  )(1 + 2   1)
;
c(2 + (1 + 2))(1  1)
(1  )(1 + 2   1)

:
As for R2; the optimal sting contract is, again, (29 ). This is because, by analogy with
the IAP case, conditions (33) and g2(b1) are not binding. Also notice that x222 =
c(1+2)
(1 ) > 0
and 0   22 = 2+21+2 (1 2) < 1: This, in turn, implies that, in R2; (b1 + b2) is minimized
where f 23 (b1) and f
2
2 (b1) intersect, which implies the solution.
Sting under ESPs.
Proposition 23. The optimal sting mechanism under ESPs is (29).
Proof. By analogy with the previous cases, in R1; (30) is not binding. Also notice that, in
this case, (33) is not binding either, since  12 < 0 and x
12
2 =
c(1+a2)
(1 ) <
c

: Since, by (7), 1  12 ;
the unique solution in this case is b^1 =

c
(1 ) ; 0

:
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As for R2; we rst notice that, given that j1j  12 ;  23 > 1: Since, by (7),j2j <  (i.e.
x22 >
c

; then the optimal solution is the intersection between f 12 (b1) and g3(b1); that is,
(29).
C. The contract space
Figure A1 provides a graphic sketch of the solutions of the two mechanism design prob-
lems, wing and sting, under the assumptions that both agents share the same preference
type, either IAP, or SSP or ESP, although they may di¤er in their individual parameters
(s; s); provided they belong to the corresponding preference set. The (rather tedious)
details of the 2 3 = 6 proofs are reported in Appendix A.
Figure A1. Optimal contracts
The two big circles of Figure 2 correspond to the optimal contracts, wing and sting, when
both players hold EPs, whereas the small circles correspond to the contracts actually used in
the experiment. Notice that some points lie outside the feasible regions dening the optimal
contract space for each preference type: this is because, in some periods, the optimal contracts
were derived in the case of subjectsheterogeneous preference types and, therefore, their
characterization was not covered by any of our propositions, and was evaluated numerically
(see Section Treatments below for further details).
As Figure A1 shows, wing and sting optimal contracts cover two disjoint regions of the
b1  b2 contract space: sting contracts di¤er from wing, essentially, for the fact that player
1 is paid substantially more (while player 2 benets are more similar across mechanisms).
This is because, as we shall explain in Appendix A, in sting, player 1s benet needs to be
high enough to make the e¤ort decision a weakly dominant strategy. We also notice that
the sting cloudis somehow more dispersed.
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Appendix B 
Experimental Instructions 
 
WELCOME TO THE EXPERIMENT!  
 
 
• This is an experiment to study how people make decisions. We are only interested in what 
people do on average. 
• Please, do not think we expect a particular behavior from you. On the other hand, keep in 
mind that your behavior will affect the amount of money you can win. 
• In what follows you will find the instructions explaining how this experiment runs and how 
to use the computer during the experiment.  
• Please do not bother the other participants during the experiment. If you need help, raise 
your hand and wait in silence. We will help you as soon as possible. 
 
THE EXPERIMENT 
 
• In this experiment, you will play for 72 subsequent rounds. These 72 rounds are divided in 
3 PHASES, and every PHASE has 24 rounds. 
 
PHASE 1 
 
• In each of the 24 rounds of PHASE 1, you will play with ANOTHER PLAYER in this 
room.  
• The identity of this person will change one round after the other. You will never know if 
you interacted with the OTHER PLAYER in the past, nor the OTHER PLAYER will ever 
know if he has interacted with you. This means your choices will always remain 
anonymous.  
• At each round of PHASE 1, first the computer will randomly choose 4 different 
OPTIONS, that is, four monetary payoff pairs, one for you and one for the OTHER 
PLAYER. Every OPTION will always appear on the left of the screen.  
• Then, you and the OTHER PLAYER have to choose, simultaneously, your favorite 
OPTION.  
• Once you and the OTHER PLAYER have made your decision, the computer will 
randomly determine who (either you or the OTHER PLAYER) will decide the OPTION 
for the pair.  
• We will call this player the CHOOSER of the game.  
• The identity of the CHOOSER will be randomly determined in each round.  
• On average half of the times you will be the CHOOSER and half of the time the 
OTHER PLAYER will be the CHOOSER. 
• Thus, in each round, the monetary payoffs that both players receive will be determined by 
the choice of the CHOOSER. 
 
PHASE 2 
 
• In the following 24 rounds of PHASE 2, you will participate to a game similar to the 
previous one, with some modifications. 
• In PHASE 2, each pair will face a payoffs matrix that appears on the left of the screen. 
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BID NO YES 
NO 40,40 40+b1/4, 30+b2/4 
YES 30+b1/4, 40+b2/4 30+b1, 30+b2 
 
 
What does this matrix mean? 
 
• In each round, you and the OTHER PLAYER, will receive an initial endowment of 40 
pesetas. 
• In each round, you and the OTHER PLAYER have to choose, simultaneously, whether to 
BID or NOT TO BID . 
• Bidding costs 10 pesetas, not bidding does not cost anything. 
• You choose the ROW, the OTHER PLAYER chooses the COLUMN.  
• Every cell of the matrix (which depends on the monetary payoffs b1 and b2 and your 
decisions on whether or not to bid) contains two numbers. 
• The first number (on the left) is what you win in this round. The second (on the 
• right) is what the OTHER PLAYER wins in this round. There are four possibilities: 
 
1. If both players bid, both sum to the initial endowment their ENTIRE 
MONETARY PAYOFF b1 or b2 (to which it will be subtracted the cost of 
bidding of 10 pesetas). 
2. If you bid, and the OTHER PLAYER does not, both sum to their endowment 
ONE FOURTH of the monetary payoff b1 or b2 (and the cost of bidding will be 
subtracted to you only);  
3. If the OTHER PLAYER bids, and you don’t, both sum to their endowment 
ONE FOURTH of their monetary payoff b1 or b2 (and the cost of bidding will 
be subtracted to the OTHER PLAYER only); 
4. If nobody bids, you and the OTHER PLAYER will only gain the endowment of 
40 pesetas.
 
  
PHASE 2 is compound of 2 STAGES:  
 
• In STAGE 1, you and the OTHER PLAYER have to choose your favorite OPTION, that 
is, the game that you would like to play in STAGE 2.  
• After that you and the OTHER PLAYER have made your decision, the computer will 
randomly determine who (either you or the OTHER PLAYER) will be the CHOOSER of 
the game.  
• Like in PHASE 1, the identity of the CHOOSER, will be randomly determined in each 
round. 
• On average, half of times you will be the CHOOSER and half of times the OTHER 
PLAYER will be the CHOOSER.  
• Once the CHOOSER has determined the option that will be played in this round, you and 
the other player have to choose whether TO BID or NOT TO BID and the monetary 
consequences of your decisions are exactly those we just explained. 
 
SUMMING UP 
 
• In each of the 24 rounds of PHASE 2, you will play with ANOTHER PLAYER of this 
room.  
• In STAGE 1, you and the other player, like in STAGE 1, have to choose  simultaneously 
your favorite OPTION. 
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•  After that you and the OTHER PLAYER have made your decisions, the CHOOSER will 
determine the game that you will play in STAGE 2. 
• In STAGE 2 you and the OTHER PLAYER have to simultaneously DECIDE whether to 
bid or not to bid. The payoffs of each round depend on your initial endowment of 40 
pesetas, on both your choices (to bid or not to bid), on the OPTION chosen by the 
CHOOSER and on the cost of bidding of 10 pesetas.  
• The PAYOFF MATRIX (that it will always appear on the left of your screen) sums up, in a 
compact form, the monetary consequences of your choices. 
 
PHASE 3 
 
• In the last 24 rounds of PHASE 3, you will play in a game similar to the PHASE 2 but with 
some differences.  
• Within the 24 persons in this room, the computer will randomly choose two groups of 12. 
• In each group of 12 people, the computer will randomly determine, 8 PLAYERS and 4 
REFEREES.  
• The identity of PLAYERS and REFEREES is randomly determined at the beginning of 
PHASE 2 and it will remain the same for the rest of the experiment. 
 
PHASE 3 has 3 STAGES.  
 
• Like in the previous PHASES, in STAGE 1 the computer randomly selects 4 OPTIONS, 
(that is, 4 pairs of monetary payoffs (b1,b2) for the players.  
• In addition, in STAGE 1, each REFEREE picks an OPTION within the 4 available for 
that round (that could be the same or different among them).  
• Thus, the 4 OPTIONS selected by the four REFEREES will be proposed to the 8 
PLAYERS of their group.  
• In STAGE 2, the 8 players will be randomly paired. Like before, agents will be rematched 
at every round. 
• Then, just like in STAGE 2, each player has to select one among the 4 OPTIONS 
proposed by the 4 REFEREES.  
• Just like in PHASE 2, the (randomly selected) CHOOSER will determine the game to be 
played by the pair.  
• Just like in PHASE 2, in the game, both PLAYERS have to choose simultaneously, 
whether TO BID or NOT TO BID. 
• The monetary consequences for the players of their decision are exactly the same as in 
STAGE 2. 
 
REFEREES’ PAYOFF 
 
The REFEREES’ payoffs depend on  
 
1. the OPTION they offer,  
2. how many REFEREES in their group offer the same OPTION 
3. how many CHOOSERS choose the same OPTION 
4. Players’ actions in the game. 
 
We shall make this clearer with some examples. 
 
CASE 1 
 
• First, suppose that the REFEREE offered an OPTION with payoffs (b1, b2) and that only 
one CHOOSER has chosen this option.  
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• The payoff of each REFEREE depends on the positive VALUE randomly generated by 
the computer and that each REFEREE (and only her) knows, and, in addition, on the sum 
of the payoffs b1+b2 in the following way: 
 
• if both players bid, the REFEREE win the difference between his VALUE and the sum of 
the payoffs; that is,  V-(b1+b2); 
• if one player bids and the other does not, the REFEREE win ONE FOURTH of the 
difference between his VALUE and the sum of the payoffs; that is, 
! 
V " (b1+ b2)
4
 
• if nobody bids, the REFEREE does not win anything. 
 
 
In this case, the PAYOFF MATRIX of the REFEREE, will be as follows: 
 
 
BID NO YES 
NO 0 (V-(b1+b2))/4 
YES (V-(b1+b2))/4 V-(b1+b2) 
 
 
CASE 2 
 
• Suppose now that more than one CHOOSER chose the option that the REFEREE 
 offered. Moreover, suppose moreover that this REFEREE is the only one that picked this 
OPTION. 
• In this case, the REFEREE gets the sum of the payoffs obtained with each couple that 
chose her OPTION.  
• The payoff with each couple will be determined as in CASE 1, taking into account if they 
bid, if only one bids or nobody bids. 
 
 
CASE 3 
 
• Suppose now that one or more CHOOSERS chose an option that the REFEREE 
 offered. Moreover, suppose that more than one REFEREE picked the same OPTION. In 
this case, every single REFEREE that chose the same OPTION gets a payoff with the 
same structure as in CASE 2, but now, sharing this payoff with the REFEREES that 
picked the same option. 
 
CASE 4 
 
• Suppose now that no couple chose the option that the REFEREE offered. In this case, her 
payoff for this round will be 0. 
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EP
α=β=0
Q1
α,β>0
Q2
α>0,β<0
Q3
α,β<0
Q4
α<0,β>0
Agents 11
22.9%
8
16.7%
10
20.8%
6
12.5%
13
27.1%
Principals 3
12.5%
6
25%
6
25%
1
4.3%
8
33.3%
Total 14
19.4%
14
19.4%
10
22.2%
7
9.7%
21
29.2%
Table 1: Preference types of agents and principals
wing contracts
i is Player 1
φj= −1
(103)
φj= 0
(236)
φi= −1
(118)
φi= 0
(211)
Total
(339)
No Dict. 0.36 0.60 0.45 0.56 0.52
Dict. 0.27 0.57 0.21 0.65 0.49
Total 0.33 0.58 0.34 0.60 0.51
i is Player 2
φj= −1
(118)
φj= 0
(211)
φi= −1
(103)
φi= 0
(236)
Total
(339)
No Dict. 0.21 0.50 0.19 0.46 0.39
Dict. 0.40 0.50 0.33 0.54 0.47
Total 0.31 0.50 0.28 0.50 0.43
sting contracts
i is Player 1
φj= −1
(202)
φj= 0
(323)
φi= −1
(181)
φi= 0
(344)
Total
(525)
0.92 0.93 0.90 0.94 0.93
0.93 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.92
0.93 0.92 0.89 0.94 0.92
i is Player 2
φj= −1
(181)
φj= 0
(344)
φi= −1
(202)
φi= 0
(323)
Total
(525)
0.31 0.69 0.31 0.72 0.55
0.61 0.73 0.62 0.73 0.69
0.44 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.62
Table 2: Relative frequency of positive effort decisions in P2. Number of
cases in Parenthesis
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Beliefs
¡
λki
¢
Coeff. Std.err. p− value
ψ1 0.196 0.508 0.700
ψ2 0.015 0.009 0.084
ψ3 -0.114 0.038 0.003
Reciprocity (θi) Coeff. Std.err. p− value
θ1 -0.081 0.070 0.248
θ2 -0.072 0.087 0.409
θ3 0.093 0.059 0.118
θ4 0.058 0.114 0.611
Table 3: Estimated parameters of beliefs function and reciprocity. Bootstrap
and matching group adjusted standard errors
P2 P3
Player 1 0.98 0.89
Player 2 0.68 0.76
Principals 0.75
Table 4: Relative frequencies of the Sting choice in the “mixed” rounds
P2, Player 2 P3, Principals
Coeff. Std.err. p-val Coeff. Std.err. p-val
ψ0 -0.060 0.215 0.779 0.493 0.250 0.048
ψ1 -0864 0.338 0.011 0.329 0.276 0.234
ψ2 0.700 0.349 0.045 0.311 0.389 0.424
ψ3 21.248 4.919 0.000 11.979 5.269 0.023
Obs 288 192
Table 5: Sting vs Wing choice in the “mixed” rounds, logit regression
2
Page 57 of 62
P2
wing
(339)
sting
(525)
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
Non Dictator 0.52 0.39 0.93 0.55
Dictator 0.49 0.47 0.92 0.69
Total 0.51 0.43 0.92 0.62
P3
wing
(222)
sting
(354)
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
Non Dictator 0.47 0.42 0.90 0.63
Dictator 0.42 0.44 0.92 0.64
Total 0.44 0.43 0.91 0.64
Table 6: Relative frequencies of positive effort decisions in P2 and P3. Num-
ber of cases for each player type in parenthesis
P2, wing P2, sting
None Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Both None Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Both
Rounds 1-12 44
26.2%
37
22%
24
14.3%
63
37.5%
10
3.8%
83
31.4%
8
3.0%
163
61.7%
Rounds 13-24 80
46.8%
31
18.1%
19
11.1%
41
24%
19
7.3%
90
34.5%
5
1.9%
147
56.3%
Total 124
36.6%
68
20.1%
43
12.7%
104
30.7%
29
5.5%
173
33%
13
2.5%
310
59.1%
P3, wing P3, sting
None Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Both None Pl. 1 Pl. 2 Both
Rounds 1-12 35
30.7%
22
19.3%
15
13.2%
42
36.8%
6
3.5%
46
26.4%
7
4.0%
115
66.1%
Rounds 13-24 59
54.6%
10
9.3%
15
13.9%
24
22.2%
17
9.4%
60
33.3%
2
1.1%
101
56.1%
Total 94
42.3%
32
14.4%
30
13.5%
66
29.7%
23
6.5%
106
29.9%
9
2.5%
216
61.0%
Table 7: Outcome dynamics in the effort game. Absolute values and row
percentages
3
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Mixed Non mixed
Dep.var.:τk Coeff. Std.err. p-value Coeff. Std.err. p-value
ψ1 0.119 0.093 0.201 0.294 0.104 0.005
ψ2 0.206 0.143 0.149 0.276 0.184 0.134
ψ3 0.002 0.004 0.673 -0.004 0.005 0.472
Left censored 16 (8.6%) 30 (7.8%)
Uncensored 76 (39.6%) 90 (23.4%)
Right censored 100 (52.1%) 264 (68.8%)
Mixed Non mixed
Dep.var.:ρk Coeff. Std.err. p-value Coeff. Std.err. p-value
ψ1 -0.061 0.034 0.075 -0.191 0.073 0.009
ψ2 -0.084 0.061 0.168 -0.203 0.119 0.088
ψ3 -0.001 0.002 0.495 0.003 0.003 0.316
Left censored 85 (44.3%) 218 (56.8%)
Uncensored 68 (35.4%) 138 (35.9%)
Right censored 39 (20.3%) 28 (7.3%)
Table 8: Relative cost choice (τ) and inequality - total costs trade off (ρ)
for principals in P3. All specifications include a full set of period dummies.
Bootstrap and cluster adjusted standard errors
4
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Mixed Non mixed
Player 1 Coeff. Std.err. p-value Coeff. Std.err. p-value
ψ1 -0.030 0.015 0.048 0.070 0.064 0.272
ψ2 -0.041 0.021 0.050 -0.381 0.114 0.001
Left censored 101 (35.1%) 313 (54.3%)
Uncensored 139 (48.3%) 209 (36.3%)
Right censored 48 (16.7%) 54 (9.4%)
Mixed Non mixed
Player 2 Coeff. Std.err. p-value Coeff. Std.err. p-value
ψ1 -0.031 0.023 0.178 -0.185 0.090 0.040
ψ2 -0.043 0.020 0.034 -0.181 0.097 0.062
Left censored 168 (81.1%) 467 (81.1%)
Uncensored 109 (37.8%) 97 (16.8%)
Right censored 11 (3.8%) 12 (2.1%)
Table 9: Inequality - inefficiency trade off (ρ) for agents in P2. All specifi-
cations include a full set of period dummies. Bootstrap and cluster adjusted
standard errors
5
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P2
wing
(359)
sting
(505)
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
Non Dictator 0.34 0.27 0.77 0.42
Dictator 0.34 0.37 0.83 0.47
Total 0.34 0.32 0.80 0.44
P3
wing
(233)
sting
(343)
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
Non Dictator 0.25 0.31 0.82 0.48
Dictator 0.17 0.20 0.84 0.51
Total 0.21 0.25 0.83 0.49
Table 11: Relative frequencies of positive effort decisions in P2 and P3 of
TR2. Number of cases for each player type in parenthesis
7
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